Academic Governance: A US Perspective on External, Internal, and Collegial Models

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Abstract
US academic governance is distinguished by its emphasis on market competition and institutional corporatization. The critical dimensions of US external and internal academic governance are explored. An important contributor to the success of US academic institutions is their reliance on shared governance and collegial mechanisms of control. But poorly designed government regulation can motivate inefficient rent-seeking behavior in higher education. The paper concludes with a discussion of needed research on means of achieving effective collective action among peers in contemporary institutions of higher education.

Keywords: external and internal governance, academic autonomy, rent-seeking behavior, collegial control

1. Introduction
The focus of our meeting is university governance and its evolution around the world. Academic governance, particularly in the developed nations, has always been influenced by the norms and traditions within each country's university sector. But historically it has also been affected by the regulatory framework of policies and laws influencing each nation's higher education system. While the changes in academic governance in any particular country are therefore path dependent, there is an observable trend in the policies of many developed countries including Japan toward a greater "corporatization" of universities (Oba, 2014). This involves government policies which encourage greater market competition among academic institutions, deregulate the university sector, as well as promote each institution's independence and capacity for strategic decision making. This trend in national policies is sometimes described as the "Americanization" of higher education. The use of this term suggests public policymakers' enthusiasm for pursuing

1 Paper to be presented at the conference, National Universities’ Incorporation Revisited from Global Perspectives: Changing government control as external governance, Tohoku University, Japan, 27-28 May 2017.
the high global rankings attributed to US universities, but this term also frequently reflects
the disdain of many university academics outside the US for the institutional changes being
imposed by their government’s policy.

In comparative terms the regulatory framework of US higher education is unusual in
its emphasis on market competition and on the corporatist governance of academic
institutions. Governance within American universities also has some distinctive
characteristics, which in my view positively influence the quality of US higher
education. But the US is now experiencing some negative effects from ineffective
regulation of its higher education markets. To what extent US academic governance
should serve as an archetype for other nations is debatable, but the American
experience does provide insight into the advantages and perils of market competition
in higher education. Consequently, in my remarks I will pursue three objectives.
First, I will outline some of the discovered strengths of the US regulatory framework
and institutional governance in the contemporary environment. Second, based upon
the US experience, I will suggest some of the limitations of market-oriented policies
for higher education currently being implemented in the US and in other countries.
Finally, I will outline a conceptual approach to collegial governance, which in my view
warrants greater interest and attention in future research on higher education.

2. US University Governance

The concept of “governance” is subject to different definitions, but in its broadest
sense refers to governmentally determined policies to assure the proper functioning of
organizations and their acceptance by the public (Dill, 2014). With regard higher
education “external governance” describes the framework of public laws and
regulations designed to assure the public interest in the functioning of universities.
However, because of the complexities of university work, academic staffs in many
countries have traditionally been granted substantial professional autonomy in
institutional decision making. Therefore, the term “internal governance” describes
the processes by which universities themselves coordinate and control academic
activity to assure the public interest.

Because of the distinctive political evolution of the US, the external governance of
American higher education has always been more market-oriented and “corporatist”
than the systems of most other developed nations. The earliest colleges in the North
American colonies were chartered under the British Crown. Following the adoption
of the US Constitution in 1789 universities were also established by the initial states
such as North Carolina. Therefore, the first national shaping of US higher education occurred
in 1819 when the US Supreme Court ruled the charter granted to Dartmouth College
in 1789 by the King of England was a contract (Rudolph 1990). Therefore, under the
US constitution the college was determined to be a private institution designed to benefit the public, not a public institution under the control of the state of New Hampshire. This case is considered a cornerstone of American corporate law, but also established the tradition of awarding ultimate control of a higher education institution to an external lay board rather than to the faculty. This Supreme Court decision also helped spawn in the following decades a nationally competitive market for higher education, characterized by public and private institutions with active administrations.

Given its federalist political framework, US academic governance has always been more institutionally focused than in countries where national governments and/or national disciplinary associations have played a more influential role in shaping university-level decisions (Musselin, 2009). This federalist framework also permitted significant variation in the external governance of universities by each of the US states. An economic analysis of the effects of US state regulations on the research performance of public universities (Aghion et al, 2010) suggested some important variables for the design of more efficient external university governance. The researchers noted most US public research universities possess “substantive” autonomy, including the freedom to select students, set curriculum, and appoint professors. However, there is much greater variation among the US states in “procedural” autonomy, such as a public university’s freedom from state purchasing regulations, from state control over its budget, and from state controls over the hiring and pay of faculty and staff. The study concluded US public research universities are most productive when they face increased competition, but also possess greater procedural autonomy. Because of the complexity of “frontier research,” the researches argued, universities can pursue it best if they control the use of their budgets, independently choose the compensation for their faculty, and hire the academic staff they most prefer.

The study’s analysis also suggested the US national policy for competitive public funding of academic research (Dill, 2010) is a further advantage of the American external governance system. In many OECD countries, the principal means for funding university research is a “dual funding” model consisting of block grants awarded on a non-competitive basis to public institutions and peer-reviewed research grants awarded by discipline-oriented research councils (Dill and van Vught, 2010). In the US by contrast, over two-thirds of the expenditures for academic research by public and private universities are funded by Federal agencies through merit-based
competition\textsuperscript{2}. These Federal grants are allocated primarily on the basis of prospective peer review of competing research proposals. Furthermore, these Federal research grants are usually accompanied by overhead support to each institution, which provides additional funds that research universities can use at their discretion to support research infrastructure and facilities.

The large proportion of US research funding allocated competitively by the Federal government has also influenced the internal governance of universities (Dill, 2010). Most US research universities have developed active research administrations focused on obtaining funds from government, industry, and foundations. These offices provide useful support and coordination for academic researchers. Similarly, and more substantively, the competitive allocation of the majority of academic research funding in the US has led to the development of organized research units (ORU) within universities. These academic units provide both disciplinary and interdisciplinary structures that can respond to social demands for relevant knowledge, and provide access to a much greater pool of resources for the research enterprise. The focus, flexibility, and adaptability of these ORUs are perceived to be one of the key factors underpinning the research prowess of the American university (Geiger, 1990).

Finally, in comparison to a number of OECD countries, external governance by the US national and state governments has traditionally permitted colleges and universities the autonomy to adjust and reform their systems of internal governance. Rather than stipulating the design of university governance structures and processes through laws or regulations, both public and private institutions have generally have been permitted to adapt and improve institutional governance as needed.

Within this US framework of external governance American colleges and universities have evolved a distinctive system of internal, “shared” governance at the institutional level (AAUP, 1996). This shared governance involves a complex balance among the mentioned lay boards of control, intended to represent the broader public interest, college and university administrators, who help coordinate and develop each institution within the competitive national system, and “collegial” academic structures such as faculty senates and academic departments, which are

\textsuperscript{2} Much attention also has been directed to the UK and Australian policies competitively awarding block grants for university research based upon performance measures (Dill and van Vught, 2010). But a less noted trend among a number of OECD nations, similar to US policy, is the increasing proportion of national research funding being competitively allocated by research councils for university research proposals. This trend was further reflected in the recent creation of the European Science Foundation, which similar to its US equivalent, awards research funds to the best peer-reviewed research proposals, regardless of the EU university or country from which they originate.
designed to enforce the professional values of academic staff.

Because of the previously described distinctive evolution of the US government as a federated republic of states, both the early private and emerging public universities adopted a corporate form of governance. From the outset, the institutional president and boards of control possessed significant influence, because all higher education institutions were highly dependent on their ability to raise funds in order to survive. Even the University of North Carolina, the first state sponsored institution to open in 1795, received no state funding during its first hundred years and was financially dependent upon donations of land from local farmers, lotteries, gifts and benefactions enticed by the University President, as well as student tuition (Powell, 1992). In contrast to England and Europe the significant influence of academic staff in the internal governance of US colleges and universities did not fully develop until the last half of the 20th Century (Rudolph, 1990).

The joint Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities by the American Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education and the Association of Governing Boards (AAUP, 1996) has served as the standard reference for “shared governance,” the US model of university internal governance. The document articulates three spheres of decision making. The governing board and administration have primary responsibility for finances, including maintaining the endowment and obtaining needed capital and operating funds. The faculty has primary responsibility for subject matter, curriculum, methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and aspects of student life clearly related to the education process. Shared responsibility among the board, administrators, and faculty exists for strategic matters such as framing long-range plans, budgeting (i.e., the allocation of financial resources), determining both short and long range priorities, and presidential selection.

One of the interesting insights from the 2007–08 Changing Academic Profession global comparative survey (Finkelstein and Cummings, 2012), which included the US and Japan, was US faculty respondents reported much higher levels of perceived influence at the department, faculty and school, as well as institutional level than the faculty of any nation surveyed. Given the long tradition of shared governance in the US, why was this the case? Too much of the research on academic governance in the US and other countries appears to have adopted a political perspective, which assumes the “hard” institutions of rules, procedures, and decision structures play a critical role in shaping the collective policies made in academic governance (Kaplan, 2006). Instead effective academic governance and performance appear related less to particular governance structures and more to the shared goals and values among members of the university community (Kaplan, 2006; Paradeise and Thoenig, 2013).
Therefore, academic governance is better understood by focusing on the “soft” institutions by which universities communicate the attitudes and norms about how governance decisions ought to be made (Kaplan, 2006).

The most useful insights to be gleaned about the American experience with “shared” governance are derived from the study of the leading public and private research universities, which represent the strongholds of academic professionalism (Dill, 2014). These universities are characterized by collegial control of major academic decision making, faculty criteria for key administrative appointments such as dean, provost, and president, and a process of department-based, bottom-up governance.

3. US Internal Academic Governance and the Mechanisms of Collegial Control

Academic departments in US universities are a significant source of professional control. In many university systems, there is a tension between personal authority, for example the significant influence traditionally granted individual professors in European universities, and collegial or collective academic authority. The US academic department is a powerful mechanism not only for protecting the professional control of academic work, but also for providing a means of constraining excessive personal authority. Academic departments in the best US universities do acknowledge the importance of faculty seniority and experience by requiring the chair of a department to be a senior or full professor and by assigning to the full professors responsibility for appointment or promotion to full professor as well as for the award of academic tenure. But in most university arts and science departments the chair is considered a “first among equals” and has a limited, renewable appointment. Over time the chair is rotated out of office and other members of the department collegium “take their turn” in the leadership role. Moreover, on most other departmental matters, such as the design of the curriculum, course assignments, the appointment of junior faculty and staff, as well as the assignment of space, voting is often by “one person, one vote.” These votes include junior members of the academic staff and the departmental structure thereby acts as a collegial brake on the personal authority of senior professors.

Other processes characteristic of the best US universities provide further examples of collegial control. For example, at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) faculty promotion and tenure recommendations approved by a department must be carefully reviewed and approved by an advisory committee to the University Chancellor. This committee is composed of the most respected professors drawn from across the university, who thereby help assure a more common standard of faculty quality across all departments. Also at UNC-CH the decision to appoint a faculty member as department chair is made by the relevant academic dean only after
personally and privately consulting with each tenure-line faculty member in the pertinent department regarding her/his views on possible candidates. As Clark (1987: 155) observed: “National systems that do not have [academic departments] seem to evolve toward [them] to tame the more narrow inclinations of individual specialists and to bring collegial principles to the fore.”

Another example of collegial control is the organization and governance of research doctoral education in leading US research universities, which is quite different from the practice in many EU countries. All research doctoral programs in a US university must follow common policies developed by the collective graduate faculty of the institution, who are members of a university-wide graduate school. These policies generally require university-wide graduate admission standards, comprehensive doctoral exams in each program to establish graduate student eligibility for the degree, prior approval of a research doctoral thesis proposal by a committee of faculty members, and a defense of the completed thesis by the same committee. In contrast, many EU universities traditionally followed a “master-apprentice” model of research doctoral education, awarding substantial autonomy to individual professors for the admission, education, and thesis supervision of each research doctoral student. Given the growing global competition in research doctoral education many EU universities are now voluntarily taking collective actions to improve their programs “with defined processes that enhance quality and aim at coordinating individual efforts” (Byrne, Jørgensen, and Loukkola, 2013). These actions include the establishment of university-wide doctoral schools, similar to US graduate schools. In a number of EU universities, the collective academic faculty have implemented university-wide rules and guidelines including: the adoption of doctoral committees to augment the expertise of the traditional thesis supervisor; the creation of university-level admissions committees for research doctoral education; and the creation of informal peer-learning groups and training opportunities for the exchange of experience and good practice among thesis supervisors. These voluntary efforts have altered the bases of academic authority within some EU universities.

An additional means of collegial control in the leading US research universities is the required external peer review of the research published by university faculty candidates for promotion and tenure. These reviews are sometimes described by foreign observers of US universities as “letters of recommendation” (Thoenig and Paradeise, 2014), but this description misperceives both their nature and function. As at UNC-CH the department chair contacts distinguished faculty members at peer universities in the candidate’s field and sends them a selection of the relevant candidate’s research. These external reviewers are asked to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the research, its significance for the relevant field, and usually
whether the specific candidate would be considered for promotion and/or tenure at the reviewer’s university. These external assessments are taken seriously by the senior department faculty members responsible for making promotion and/or tenure recommendations and these external reviews are forwarded along with all other relevant materials to the university-wide committee responsible for the ultimate faculty personnel decisions. This reliance at leading US research universities on substantive, qualitative, external peer reviews of a candidates’ published research is in marked contrast to the increasing adoption of journal citation and impact scores as a primary means for evaluating the research of academic staff in some OECD nations.

Finally, the planning and budgeting processes of leading US research universities also play a significant role in assuring the effectiveness of collegial governance, which has been well illustrated over the last 25 years by practices at Stanford University (Massy, 2016). In recent decades most leading US universities, including publicly funded universities like UNC-CH, have reformed their administrative structures to ensure -- as does Stanford -- that academic values effectively govern financial planning and budgeting decisions. This has been pursued by assigning to the chief academic officer, usually titled a Provost or Vice President of Academic Affairs, responsibility for all university planning and budgeting decisions. This responsibility often involves developing and allocating a comprehensive university operating budget -- including all operating revenues and expenses for the next year whether restricted or unrestricted -- as well as the university’s capital budget.

At Stanford, as at other leading US universities, the Provost is a senior professor, most often with prior experience as a department chair or dean. But to further assure planning and budgeting decisions truly reflect the university’s collective academic values, the Provost’s decisions are made in close consultation with a University Budget Committee. At Stanford, this committee is composed of university-level academic administrators, who are also university professors, as well as of experienced senior professors, including the chair of the Stanford Faculty Senate. At Stanford, full-time faculty members represent more than 2/3 of the University Budget Committee.

The Stanford financial planning and budgeting process also includes a number of notable practices to assure academic unity within the university (Massy, 2016). Certain academic units such as the Medical School and the Business School, which have access to substantial external funding such as private gifts and research grants or contracts, are included in the comprehensive budget, but unlike other academic units are funded on a formula basis. This formula funding, as well as needed cross-subsidies among the remaining academic units, ensures that all academic units receive sufficient financial resources to maintain and improve their academic quality.
Information on all allocations in the comprehensive budget, as well as the academic values informing these choices, are distributed to the Stanford University community annually via the *Stanford University Budget Plan*\(^3\). This very informative document effectively illustrates and communicates the university’s core academic values to all members of the University. Finally, Stanford has sometimes set as a budget planning parameter a specific limit on administrative expenses, calculated as a percentage of the total budget. Consequently, university operating budget funds are reallocated as needed to assure a maximum investment in academic instruction and research. Establishing a similar minimum percentage of a total university budget for instruction could be an effective tool in combatting the declining institutional investment in teaching and student learning now evident in the US and a number of other countries (Ehrenberg, 2012).

### 4. The Perils of Market-Oriented US Regulatory Policies

I have highlighted above some positive characteristics of the external and internal academic governance processes in US higher education. But the recent evidence on the impact of the US regulatory framework governing higher education suggests our market-oriented policies are now beginning to undermine the shared professional values and ethical beliefs that as I have stressed traditionally helped assure American academic standards and university efficiency. Similar to other policy areas such as finance and the environment (Stiglitz, 2012), poorly designed government regulations can alter incentives, encouraging the misallocation of scarce institutional resources, and distorting the professional values essential to responsible organizational performance. US policies expected to improve academic quality and efficiency through market mechanisms instead now appear to encourage “rent-seeking” behavior (Stiglitz, 2012) by universities and their academic personnel. That is, the pursuit of private benefits or “rents,” in excess of what could be earned in a hypothetical perfectly competitive market.

The early economic research on rent-seeking focused on organizational efforts to induce more favorable government regulation and taxation through active lobbying (Stiglitz, 2012). This behavior is now increasingly represented in higher education by the time and financial resources invested by prestigious university groups such as the American Association of Universities or the UK Russell Group as a means of seeking more favorable national funding and regulatory treatment. But more recent economic research (Stiglitz, 2012; Muller, 2017) emphasizes how poorly designed

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government regulatory policies themselves may actually promote inefficient behavior within relevant organizations by altering existing incentives and compromising traditional ethical practices.

For example, government policies intended to promote the “corporatization” of universities often encourage more centralized, hierarchical, administrator control of university governance, diminishing faculty influence over academic standards and efficiency. But an emphasis on administrator authority in universities is likely less efficient for society than well designed collegial processes of governance and decision making, because long-term academic staff are more likely to provide truly independent judgments on critical university decisions than are shorter-term administrators who may personally benefit from the decisions made (McPherson and Schapiro, 1999). As Williams (2013, 67-69) observed with regard dishonest management in the UK university sector:

In any economic or social organization, there is always a risk of corruption, as some people in positions of influence use their power for their own advantage rather than for that of the organization or society to which they owe allegiance.

In a competitive market system those in positions of authority are particularly susceptible to temptation, especially if they promote entrepreneurial behaviour where success is measured largely in terms of effective innovations, which often means bending the rules, sometimes to breaking point. However, the adoption of market values and financial incentives greatly increases the temptation.

Certain British universities have been fined considerable sums for over-recruiting on student target numbers and occasionally for submitting misleading statistical returns about numbers of students and course completions.

Furthermore, research on university governance in the US indicates administrators and academic staff members pursue different goals and interests (Kaplan, 2004). An economic behavioral model of shared governance (Carroll, Dickson and Ruseski, 2012), which controlled for the degree of faculty participation in US higher education, discovered that decisions made primarily by administrators led to an overinvestment in university “non-academic quality,” such as athletics, amenities for student life, and residential facilities. Administrator-controlled decisions also led to increased undergraduate enrollments and to higher total costs for undergraduate students. In contrast decisions reflecting greater faculty participation in governance led to lower investments in non-academic quality and to higher levels of graduate enrollment, to greater sponsored funding, and to increased academic quality as measured by the
scope and rigor of academic program offerings as well as faculty qualifications. Based upon their measures of impacts the authors concluded, when compared to greater administrative authority, increased faculty participation in academic governance, particularly in tight fiscal times, yields more socially optimal outcomes.

Recent economic research in the US system of higher education (Ehrenberg, 2012) similarly reveals rent-seeking behavior in academic decision-making. The US system is experiencing rapid growth of temporary part-time and full-time instructional staff in order to free research-oriented faculty from teaching obligations, a change also observable in other developed nations (Teichler, Arimoto, and Cummings 2013). But in the US this growth in temporary instructional staff is associated with declines in first degree student progression and graduation rates. Furthermore, the simplistic measures of academic quality utilized in commercial university rankings in the US (as well as in government-sponsored university ranking systems in other countries) -- particularly the heavy weight awarded indicators of faculty research -- provide an incentive for universities to cross-subsidize research expenditures with public funds and student tuition fees traditionally invested in instruction. In the US the proportion of institutional funds expended on instruction has been declining, while the proportion of institutional funds expended on research has been rapidly rising (Ehrenberg, 2012). A comparably simplistic measure of instruction -- standardized student satisfaction surveys of teaching -- is commonly used in the US and increasingly mandated for the evaluation of academic staff by national quality assurance policies in other nations. But US research on standardized student surveys (Stark and Freishtat, 2014) suggests these scores are biased by discriminatory evaluations of women and minorities, positively associated with the award of inflated student grades, and are negatively related to direct evidence of student learning.

Ironically, as these examples of academic rent-seeking behavior in the US suggest, the damaging effects of poorly designed regulatory policies on higher education appear to fall disproportionately on the quality of academic instruction and student learning. Many academic staff in the US and other countries have resisted these behavioral changes, continuing to invest significant time and effort in improving instruction and validly assessing student work. But over time, poorly designed regulatory policies can corrode and undermine the social contract of shared ethical beliefs and professional values among academic staff essential to assuring academic standards. This reality is reflected in a recent publication by a UNESCO agency (Daniel 2016) designed to clarify and publicize the significant dangers to academic

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4 Recent research in France has discovered similar issues of reliability and validity in the standardized student satisfaction surveys now used in many other countries (Boring, Ottoboni, and Stark, 2016).
quality posed by corrupt university behavior.
As Elinor Ostrom (2010) pointedly argued in her acceptance of the Nobel Prize in Economics, neither the regulatory rules of the state nor market forces are the most effective institutional arrangements for governing, managing, and providing complex public goods in self-organizing institutions. Instead she called for the systematic study of the core processes by which self-organizing institutions like universities determine and implement necessary collective actions (Ostrom and Hess, 2007). How can this best be accomplished in research on university governance? I would like to close by discussing a recent US policy which illustrates some of the concepts developed by Emmanuel Lazega, a French sociologist (Lazega, 2001, 2005). Lazega has developed a sophisticated model for research on collegial organizations. As I have suggested, his model focuses on the social mechanisms which make it possible for interconnected professionals to cooperate and engage in collective actions for the efficient production of complex work.

5. Human Subjects Research

Over the last several decades many nations including the US and Japan have implemented national policies on human subjects research (Office for Human Research Protections, 2017). In 1974 the US Congress first adopted a National Research Policy, which similar to the recent national reforms of higher education in other nations, was a unitary policy affecting all public and private universities in the US (Dill, 2016). Violations of the policy involved serious sanctions -- the suspension of all Federal academic research funds for an offending institution -- and some respected universities have been so penalized. But in marked contrast to the recent reforms of higher education policy in a number of other nations, the US policy did not establish a new regulatory agency, did not require universities to publicly publish information on their professional performance, nor did the policy assign greater authority to university administrators (Dill, 2016). Rather the policy featured a professionally developed set of ethical requirements and research responsibilities for academic staff, required universities to effectively communicate these norms to all academic researchers, and required the establishment of university Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), composed primarily of academic peers, to approve all relevant proposed research.

The US human subjects research policy and its impacts on US universities well illustrate a number of the core concepts of Lazega’s model of collegial control. The national policy developed and communicated among relevant professionals the ethical “values and norms essential to effective professional performance” for research on human subjects. The policy also required each university academic staff to collectively develop and implement a new “lateral control mechanism,” i.e.
IRBs composed primarily of respected university academic researchers, to approve all relevant proposed research. The national policy clarified who in the university possesses “the authority to know” by requiring university IRBs include academic staff members who are expert in medical research, research design, and ethics, as well as representatives of vulnerable subject populations. Indeed, the national policy reinforced if not strengthened the authority of the collective university faculty over research. The policy stipulated no negative IRB decision could be overturned by a university administrator or appeal body, a ruling thus far upheld by the US courts. In addition, the university IRBs have developed a process of “graduated sanctions” for unprofessional or opportunistic academic behavior. That is, respected academic colleagues on the IRBs first talk with and counsel potential research violators on means of improving flawed research proposals. Only after serious efforts at personal education and socialization may a negative decision be rendered. Finally, the IRBS have provided a new collegial mechanism by which each university can renegotiate the shared “precarious professional values” essential to effective academic work. For example, the potential conflict between researchers’ academic freedom and their ethical responsibility for research participants. The IRB process now provides a means for each university to make, clarify, and regularly communicate to the members of the university community revised ethical standards for research based upon previous peer-reviewed case decisions. The IRB process thereby provides a more immediate and respected mechanism for addressing the uncertainties and complexities caused by the ongoing technical innovations and new developments in academic research.

The human subjects review policy experience in the US also illustrates some of the continuing challenges of collegial governance identified by Lazega (2005). These include the frustration of academic staff with the time and cost involved in peer review and the increasing problem of the ablest professors withdrawing from engagement in collegial governance, because of the increasing demands of teaching, research, and administration.

6. Conclusion

Further research is needed to assess the impact of recent national policy reforms on the behavior of universities and academic staff. But we also need to recognize as work in developed nations grows increasingly knowledge-intensive, as businesses and governments recruit additional professionals, and as management structures become flatter and more decentralized, additional effective research on the collegial form of organization could make a vital contribution to society as a whole. With regard higher education, more systematic research on internal academic governance
is genuinely needed, which focuses on the problem of how to achieve effective collective action among peers. That is, how do universities successfully organize and conduct academic work, how do they maintain and improve quality, how do they preserve professional unity, how do they control academic deviance, and how do they balance academic continuity with the need for continual technical change (Lazega, 2005)? One can best address these questions by studying the internal collective processes of universities, identifying, as I have tried to suggest, means of rationalization through collegial action. I believe knowledge of the social mechanisms for achieving durable cooperation among professionally rival academic peers remains the best means for improving academic governance and lowering the costs of universities in all countries.

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